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International Sports: Have States
Succeeded Athletes as the Players?
Barbara O'Neill's Comment on international sports law is
timely in this year of the Olympic Games. We can only hope that
the nationalism roiling around a sharply divided Korean peninsula
will not defeat one of the world's most visible experiments in cross-
cultural association and cooperation. In too many instances states
have indeed succeeded athletes on the global playing fields and, as
between states and athletes, the field is anything but level. Perhaps,
if we are going to refer to states as "international actors," that is
what we should expect. In any event, Ms. O'Neill correctly confirms
that sports, politics and nationalism are inseparable.
Nationalism, especially, needs regulation. Fortunately, recent
decades have witnessed the growth of a new body of international
sports law to meet this challenge. As this Comment indicates, sev-
eral Rules of the Olympic Charter and related practices have be-
come customary law. The charisma and high visibility of the
Olympic Games help explain the unusual influence of the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee (IOC) in the legal process. Like the In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross, for example, the IOC ex-
emplifies the role of some nongovernmental organizations in the
functional process of international integration and progressive de-
velopment of international law. Although international sports law
has crystallized around an Olympic nucleus, other institutions have
also made contributions. These institutions include national govern-
ments, whose foreign sports policies influence the formulation of
law and often aggregate into custom; a good example is the (U.S.)
Amateur Sports Act of 1978. Other contributors to the new body of
law include such political groupings as the (British) Commonwealth
and international organizations, such as the United Nations bodies
that have been instrumental in combating apartheid in the sports
arena. Understandably, this new body of law is still somewhat soft
and undeveloped. Several sports-related problems-in particular,
commercial transactions for the sale and purchase of sports equip-
ment, contracts between professional players and their teams, net-
work broadcasting contracts and personal injuries on the playing
field-remain largely the province of more traditional bodies of
law. Even so, states usually conform their behavior to accepted
practices in the global sports arena. International sports law thus
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helps protect athletes and athletic competition against harmful po-
litical intrusion. International law has proven to be good protection
for athletes.
Foreword by James A.R. Nafziger*
* Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law and author of INTERNA-
TIONAL SPORTS LAW, scheduled for publication in June, 1988 (Transnational Publishers). This
Preface was written in early April 1988.
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The aims of the Olympic Movement [1] are to promote the
development of those fine and moral qualities which are the ba-
sis of amateur sport and [2] to bring together the athletes of the
world in a great quadrennial festival of sports thereby creating
international respect and goodwill and [3] thus helping to con-
struct a better and more peaceful world.'
I. Introduction
"Nine Israelis on Olympic team slain with four Arabs as Ger-
man Police Fight Raiders,"2 was the headline of the New York
Times on September 6, 1972. The tragedy occurred at the Olympic
village in Munich, West Germany, the site of the 1972 Summer
Olympic Games. Headlines concerning Olympic athletes usually
center on a much happier note. This tragedy, however, is evidence of
a very real problem that has entered the international sports arena
- the problem of terrorism, and the killing and injuring of innocent
people. Terrorism and other modern-day political issues have in-
truded into the sports world, making it extremely difficult for ath-
letic events to be held for purposes of sportsmanship and good will.3
Athletes, as representatives of their countries in international
sporting events, inevitably feel strong ties to them. Feelings of na-
tionalism,4 experienced by the individual athletes, are also aroused at
home. With nationalistic sentiments at a high, many nations are
prompted to exert diplomatic and political pressure via international
sporting events. In many instances governments use international
sports programs for diplomatic or political gain as well as for the
positive experiences gained by the athletes.6 However, governments
also use international sports to achieve political gains that are totally
unrelated to sports or to the individual participants. Such abuses of
sport often result in harm to the athletes, whose concerns are often
ignored by the countries involved. Terrorism is such an abuse of
sport. Innocent lives are taken so that a government or a group can
convey a message to an adversary.
This Comment will examine uses and abuses of sport in the in-
ternational arena. Emphasis will be placed on the employment of
Olympic sport in particular, but international sport as a whole. Sec-
1. Nafziger, The Regulation of Transnational Sports Competition: Down From Mount
Olympus, 5 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 180, 185 (1971) [hereinafter Nafziger, Transnational Sports].
2. N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1972, at Al.
3. Nafziger, Transnational Sports, supra note 1, at 178. Sportsmanship and good will
are Olympic ideals. Id.
4. Nationalism is defined as "Concern for or attachment to a particular nation's inter-
ests of culture." WEBSTER'S 11 NEw RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY, 468 (5th ed. 1984).
5. See infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
6. Sports exchanges, for example, are culturally stimulating experiences and are espe-
cially beneficial to the athletes.
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tion II will examine the International Olympic System as the legal
framework within which international sports law operates. Section
III will analyze the uses of sport as a foreign relations tool, since the
more sport becomes a bargaining chip for nations, the less important
the athletes become. Section IV will discuss rules and regulations of
the Olympic System that have been used to combat this political
manipulation of sporting events. Finally, a plea is made for nations
participating in international sports events not to lose sight of the
main players, the athletes.
II. The International Olympic System
The Olympic Games 7 involve far more than athletes engaging in
physical sports competition. Athletes, nations (states), and individu-
als within the Olympic institutional apparatus are all a part of the
events constituting the International Olympic Games.8 Although the
founders of the modern Olympic Movement 9 tried to keep politics
and sports separate, the practice of politics in international sporting
events is inevitable because these events provide a world-wide forum
for issues and interests that might not otherwise be addressed. How-
ever, the framework of the Olympic System together with the rules
and law upon which the system is based operate to keep the politics
out of the actual Olympic sports arenas."0
A. The International Olympic Committee
The International Olympic System is comprised of the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee (IOC)," the National Olympic Commit-
tees (NOC), 12 the International Sports Federations,' the Regional
Games Federations,"' and the Games Organizing Committees.'
7. Kanin, The Olympic System: Transnational Sport Organization and the Politics of
Cultural Exchange, in SPORT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 515, 522 (B. Lowe, D. Kanin
and A. Strenk eds. 1978).
8. Nafziger, Transnational Sports, supra note 1, at 189.
9. Pierre de Coubertin, in 1894, founded the Modern Olympic Movement, which con-
sists of the organizations that run the Olympic Games. Kanin, supra note 7, at 523.
10. Nafziger, Transnational Sports, supra note 1, at 203. "[T]he Olympic regime nev-
ertheless has proven effective in resisting a preponderance of diplomatic machinations within
the Olympic arena and in assuring a continuing measure of universality to the Games." Id.
The IOC has, on occasion, taken positive action "to discourage politics from entering the
sports arena." Id. at 203, n.75. For example, in 1962 the IOC suspended Indonesia for prohib-
iting Israeli and Taiwanese athletes from participating in the Asian Games for politically-
based reasons. Id.
11. The purpose of the International Olympic Committee, founded in 1894, is to run the
Olympic Games and preserve the Olympic ideal of international goodwill and sportsmanship.
Kanin, supra note 7, at 523.
12. The National Olympic Committees are the representatives of the International
Olympic Committee in each country. Id. at 524.
13. The International Sports Federations are the authorities on the technical aspects of
each sport. Id. at 526.
14. The Regional Games Federations are responsible for running the Regional Games,
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These organizations regulate and coordinate the Olympic Games,
the regional games," and the world, regional and national champi-
onships of each sport.' 7 Power within the Olympic System is distrib-
uted between member organizations; central decision-making powers
are shared by the IOC, the international sports federations and the
Regional Games Federations.1 However, the central organ of the
Olympic System is the IOC, which acts as "the final authority on all
questions concerning the Olympic Games and the Olympic
Movement." 19
Under international law, the IOC is a corporate entity "having
juridical status and perpetual succession."20 The responsibilities of
the IOC include creating rules and regulations to guide the Olympic
decision-making process, to determine qualifications of Olympic par-
ticipants, to select the site for the Olympic Games and to elect its
own officers and committee chairpersons." The underlying goals of
the International Olympic Committee are to promote international
good will and sportsmanship."2
The IOC is a non-governmental organization that is comprised
of individuals, not nation-states or their representatives.23 The IOC
members are not official representatives of their states, but are in-
stead "ambassadors of the Olympic ideal to their homelands."' 4
Therefore, a crucial requirement of membership is to remain free
from any strict governmental or organizational ties that could influ-
ence decision-making ability concerning IOC matters. 8
as the IOC is responsible for running the Olympic Games. Id. at 526-27.
15. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 51-55.
16. Kanin, supra note 7, at 523. The regional games are held every four years in non-
Olympic years. Id.
17. Id. Either the federation of each sport or the sanctioned national units hold the
world, regional, and national championships at varying intervals in non-Olympic years. Id.
18. Id. at 528. "Power is distributed in such a way as to maintain an equilibrium be-
tween organs which were created independently, and which are jealous in their regard for their
own place in the system." Id. at 527.
19. Rule 23, OLYMPIC RULES. AND REGULATIONS 11 (1971) noted in Nafziger, Transna-
tional Sports, supra note 1, at 187. Rule 4 of the Olympic Charter provides that "[elvery
person or organization that plays any part whatsoever in the Olympic movement shall accept
the supreme authority of the IOC and shall be bound by its Rules and submit to its jurisdic-
tion." Rule 4, Olympic Charter (1983) noted in Nafziger, Nonaggressive Sanctions in the
International Sports Arena, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 329, 333 (1983) [hereinafter
Nafziger, Nonaggressive Sanctions].
20. Nafziger, Nonaggressive Sanctions, supra note 19, at 332.
21. Nafziger, Transnational Sports, supra note 1, at 187. The IOC consists of the Exec-
utive Board and the General Assembly, out of which the members of the Executive Board are
elected. The members of the Executive Board include a president, three vice-presidents, and
five members. R. Espy, THE POLITICS OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES app. at 175 (1979).
22. Kanin, supra note 7, at 523; see text accompanying notes 1-4.
23. Nafziger, Transnational Sports, supra note 1, at 187.
24. Kanin, supra note 7, at 524.
25. Nafziger, Transnational Sports, supra note 1, at 189. Recruitment of the IOC
members is conducted by the IOC based on the following factors: "facility in French or En-
glish, citizenship and residency in a country with a national Olympic committee, and indepen-
dence from binding instructions from any individual, organization, or sovereign government."
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B. The National Olympic Committees
As national representatives of the IOC,26 the National Olympic
Committees (NOCs),2 7 must also remain functionally separate from
the states in which they are located.28 The NOCs supervise the or-
ganization of Olympic sports in each country, 9 and are responsible
for choosing the athletic teams that will represent their respective
countries in the Olympic and regional games.30 This selection occurs
during try-outs of all eligible competitors, which normally take place
at the national championships.31 In addition, NOCs make the final
decision on whether or not the national teams will participate in the
Games. 2
In order to be permitted to send athletes to the Olympic Games,
a country's NOC must first be recognized by the IOC. The IOC
requires NOCs to represent a country that is a "viable political unit
with a stable government,"33 as determined by the IOC. Recognition
by the IOC, therefore, implies or results in the recognition of that
state's jurisdiction within its territory, and its stability as a govern-
Rule 11, OLYMPIC RULES AND REGULATIONS (1971), noted in Nafziger, Transnational
Sports, supra note 1, at 189.
26. Nafziger, Transnational Sports, supra note 1, at 189. The NOCs have jurisdiction
over all domestic matters of the IOC. Id.
27. Kanin, supra note 7, at 524. Local Olympic officials, representatives of national
sports organizations, and persons representing interested government agencies and businesses,
together form the National Olympic Committee of each state. Id. at 524.
28. Id. at 525. Rule 25 of the Olympic Rules and Regulations applies to NOCs: "Na-
tional Olympic Committees must be completely independent and autonomous and must resist
all political, religious or commercial pressure. National Olympic Committees that do not con-
form to the Rules and Regulations of the International Olympic Committee forfeit their recog-
nition and consequently their right to send participants to the Olympic Games." INTERNA-
TIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, OLYMPIC RULES AND REGULATIONS (1972), noted in Nafziger,
Legal Aspects of a United States Foreign Sports Policy, 8 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 837, 839, n.9
(1975) [hereinafter Nafziger, U.S. Sports Policy].
Rule 8 states that "the Games are contests between individuals and not between countries
or areas." Id. The NOC must be "structurally" independent of the state, but an NOC may be
under de facto control of a political unit. Most NOCs today are under government subsidy or
influence. Kanin, supra note 7, at 525. For example, the United States Olympic Committee
(USOC) is functionally independent from the United States Congress, however, it is governed
by a Congressional Charter, which may be revoked or altered by Congress. Id.
29. Note, Political Abuse of Olympic Sport, 14 N.J. INT'L L. & P. 155, 162 (1981).
"The objective of the national Olympic committees shall be to ensure the development and
safe-guarding of the Olympic movement and sport. NOCs shall be the sole authorities respon-
sible for the representation of their respective countries at the Olympic Games as well as at
other events held under the patronage of the IOC, and to see that arrangements are made for
the organization of the Games of the Olympiad and the Winter Games and the other events
mentioned above when they are held in their own country." Olympic Charter (1980) at Rule
24(B), noted in id. at 162 n.56.
30. Kanin, supra note 7, at 525. NOCs have discretionary powers with regard to meth-
ods of Olympic team selection in their respective countries. For example, NOCs of some coun-
tries select their Olympic teams from state citizens only. Id. at 526.
31. Nafziger, Transnational Sports, supra note 1, at 189.
32. Olympic Charter, at Bylaw 8 to Rule 24, noted in Nafziger, Foreign Policy in the
Sports Arena, in GOVERNMENT AND SPORT 248, 254 (A. Johnson and J. Frey eds. 1985)
[hereinafter Nafziger, Foreign Policy].
33. Kanin, supra note 7, at 525.
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ment. However, such recognition does not imply political acceptance
of that country.84
The NOCs are also responsible for the preservation of the na-
tional character of the Olympics. 3 5 For example, athletes are re-
quired to wear the official colors of their respective states when par-
ticipating in competition at the Games, and the national anthem of
the winning athlete or team is played following a victory. The NOCs
often will restrict national team membership to citizens of that
country.36
Additionally, the NOCs are instrumental in the success of the
Olympic Games, by choosing the host cities and states. Olympic
member states that maintain IOC-recognized NOCs may submit
bids to the IOC to host the Games;3" indeed bids must be submitted
through the NOC of the bidding state. 8 The representatives of state
or cities bidding to host the Olympic Games must affirmatively an-
swer fifty-two questions before they will be given consideration as
host for the Games.3 9 These questions cover matters concerning
"[riespect for IOC rules, general and cultural information, organiza-
tional matters, finances, and radio and television items."40 After
most cities have been eliminated based upon their answers to the
questionnaire, the remaining cities are asked more difficult and spe-
cific questions in an attempt to narrow host contenders for the
Games.41
Factors that the IOC weighs in the Olympic-site selection pro-
cess include: security matters, cultural and tourist offerings, and re-
cent political involvements of the city or state." The IOC's final
34. Id. OLYMPIC RULES BY-LAWS AND INSTRUCTIONS 17, Rule 25 (1976) [hereinafter
Rule] noted in Nafziger and Strenk, The Political Uses and Abuses of Sports, 10 CONN. L.R.
259, 281 (1978).
35. Kanin, supra note 7, at 526.
36. Id.
37. Attaining host nation status is a position of international prestige and is useful for
diplomatic and political purposes. Nafziger and Strenk, supra note 34, at 273. For example, by
hosting the 1964 Summer Olympics, Japan was able to rid itself of negative impressions left
over from World War II, and focus world attention on its modern and peaceful society com-
mitted to international organizations and human rights. Id.
38. Kanin, supra note 7, at 525.
39. J. LucAs, THE MODERN OLYMPIC GAMES 144 (1980).
40. Id.
41. Id. Two examples of the more specific questions asked of finalist cities are the
following:
Can you guarantee that no political meeting or demonstration will take
place in the stadium, or any other sports ground, or in the Olympic Village dur-
ing the Games?
Can you confirm that the full receipts for television, less the proportion due
to you as Organizing Committee, will be handed over when received, in con-
formity with the I.O.C. formula between the I.O.C., International Federation
and the N.O.C.'s?
Id.
42. R. EsPY, supra note 21, at 131-33.
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choice depends on what is "best for the Olympic movement."43 For
example, Moscow, Los Angeles, and Montreal, among others, had
submitted bids to host the 1976 Summer Games. Of the three, Mon-
treal was ultimately chosen." Montreal's size was a major factor in
this decision, because it had a better chance of remaining self-fi-
nanced than a larger city. Furthermore, Montreal was selected to
encourage other smaller cities to host the Games, particularly those
in developing countries."5 The IOC also anticipated that a smaller
city might be easier to secure due to the smaller area and the fewer
number of residents. Security was the major reason for the IOC's
deciding not to choose Los Angeles, with its large area and heteroge-
neous population."
Another factor in Montreal's favor in the site-selection process
was politics. While the United States was still being frowned upon
for its involvement in Vietnam, Canada was a politically neutral
country.47 Yet another consideration in Montreal's favor was that
Canada was making its second Olympic host-country bid, having lost
out to Munich for the 1972 Summer games.48 This factor became
important when Montreal was compared to Moscow, as the Soviet
Union was regarded as a newcomer to the Olympic Movement.' 9
Once a city or state has been awarded the honor of hosting the
Olympic Games, 0 that state's NOC forms a Games Organizing
Committee, with the help of the local sports federation units and the
government and business agencies.5 1 The organizing committee is re-
sponsible for preparation of the Olympic site, and for the actual
management of the Games.52 Because financing is one of the criteria
43. Id. at 132.
44. Id. at 131. Moscow officials claimed that Moscow offered a vast cultural program
and that their city's prestige would be increased in the eyes of the world. Id. Los Angeles
offered the American commercial market, particularly the television revenues in the hopes of
being chosen as the host city. Holding the Games in Los Angeles might have been profitable to
the organizers, including the possibility of being able to reimburse the IOC and the national
committees for initial expenditures. Id.
45. Id. at 133. The high costs of the Games were keeping smaller cities like Amsterdam
out of the Olympic Market. Id. Hosting the Games depletes a country's financial resources.
Montreal nearly went bankrupt after hosting the 1976 Summer Olympics at a cost of $1.27
billion. Note, supra note 29, at 163 n.65.
46. R. Espy, supra note 21, at 132. The IOC's major security concern was protecting all
the contingents and preventing incidents. These concerns would be more difficult to satisfy in
Los Angeles than in the smaller city of Montreal. Ironically, one of the reasons for the IOC's
having chosen Munich for the 1972 Games was its homogenous character and its smaller size.
Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 132-33. Preferences had always been given to cities that had been runners-up
in previous site selections. Id. at 133.
49. id.
50. Kanin, supra note 7, at 526. A host city is chosen approximately six years before the
Games take place. Id.
51. Id. at 525.
52. Id.
The organizing committee: shall be the executive body for the organization
[Vol. 6:3
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for selection of the host city or state, financing the Games is one of
the larger responsibilities of the organizing committee.5 3 Addition-
ally, the organizing committee must adhere to IOC rules, regulations
and directions,54 and the federation rules concerning equipment and
conduct of each sport.55
C. International Sports Federations
The primary decision-making body in the Olympic System is
comprised of the twenty-six International Sports Federations." Indi-
vidual federations govern the sports and athletic events of the
Olympic System. 7 For example, the International Amateur Athletic
Federation is the organization responsible for rule-making, supervi-
sion, control and development with respect to track and field compe-
titions.5 8 The federations' responsibilities include: determining stan-
dards for equipment and athletic programs, choosing referees, and
controlling participation in each sport.5 9 Participation in Olympic
competitions is restricted to amateurs, although some federations al-
low professionals to participate in non-Olympic sporting events. 60
The federations are represented at the national level through their
national affiliates." Similarly, the federations are actively involved in
the Regional Games, which are celebrated every four years, with
each region holding its Games in a non-Olympic year. 2
of the Olympic Games, . . . and shall be responsible for all the physical
problems of the organisation. It shall function by virtue of the powers which
shall have been delegated to it within prescribed limits, and it may not usurp the
powers and responsibilities of the IOC.
Olympic Charter, rule 47 (1980) noted in Note, supra note 29, at 162 n.57.
53. Kanin, supra note 7, at 526. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
54. Note, supra note 29, at 162.
55. Kanin, supra note 7, at 525.
56. Id. at 527, 528; J. LUCAS, supra note 39 at 141. "The Olympic Charter lists the
international sports federations currently recognized by the IOC." Olympic Charter, rule 35
(1980), noted in Note, supra note 29, at 162 n.55.
57. Kanin, supra note 7, at 526. Federation approval of the Olympic Program in its
sport is required at least fifteen days before those events begin in the Games. Id. Federations
governing sports not part of the Olympic program can participate in Olympic events, provided
that the sport is conducted like an Olympic Sport and its participants meet some definition of
"amateur." Id. at 527.
58. Nafziger, Transnational Sports, supra note 1, at 188.
59. Kanin, supra note 7, at 526.
60. Id. at 526-27. The IOC and the federations disagree over the precise definition of
the term "amateur." Both agree that only amateurs may participate in the Olympic Games,
but some federations allow professionals to participate in non-Olympic events. Id. For exam-
ple, the International Association Football (soccer) Federation (FIFA) allows professionals to
compete in some of their activities, such as on the national teams in the World Cup Series.
Only amateurs, however, may take part in Olympic Soccer matches. Id. at 519. Rule 26 of the
Olympic Charter states that "salaried full-time-employed professional athletes are not eligible
for Games competition." J. LUCAS, supra note 39, at 142.
61. Note, supra note 29, at 162.
62. Kanin, supra note 7, at 523. Examples of regional games include the Pan-American
Games, the Commonwealth Games, the African Games, and the Asian Games. J. LUCAS,
supra note 39, at 142.
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When the Olympic movement began, the individual was the
central figure in the field of athletics. The IOC's rules and the Na-
tional Organizing Committees have tried to keep the Olympic move-
ment centered around the individual . 3 This is a heavy burden, espe-
cially as politics becomes an even larger part of international
sporting events. However, because athletes actually play the sports
and compete on the teams, they are therefore a necessary component
in the plans of the foreign affairs departments of many countries.
III. Political Use of International Sports
It is understood within the international community by the
states and individual members of the IOC that sports and politics
are inextricably intertwined.64 This relationship between sports and
politics originated with the concept of nationalism,6 5 which is pro-
moted by the IOC, the media,66 and more importantly, by individual
states. Nationalism operates through the athletes and their relation-
ships with their respective countries, to further the interests of their
countries by participating in international and regional athletic
events.6 7 The states, however, go one step further and manipulate
world sporting events to advance their political interests.6 8 Interfer-
ence with international athletic events constitutes an abuse of sport,
and is contrary to the ideals of the Olympic Movement and interna-
tional law and custom.69
A. Nationalism
Nationalism has been present in Olympic sport since the incep-
63. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
64. See generally Kanin, supra note 7; Nafziger, Foreign Policy, supra note 32;
Nafziger, U.S. Sports Policy, supra note 28; Nafziger, Transnational Sports, supra note 1;
Nafziger and Strenk, supra note 34, and Note, supra note 29.
65. Toohey and Warning, Nationalism: Inevitable and Incurable?, in OLYMPISM 118,
119 (J. Segrave and D. Chu eds. 1981). For a definition of nationalism see supra note 4.
66. Leiper, Political Problems in the Olympic Games, in OLYMPISM 104, 104 (J.
Segrave and D. Chu eds. 1981). Since World War I1 the media has had a great impact on the
politicization of sports and of the Olympic Games by reporting events faster and to a greater
spectrum of people. Id.
67. Id. at 106-07. A country's use of international achievements of its citizens to en-
hance prestige both at home and abroad is not limited to sport, as a look at the fields of
business, culture, and science will prove. However, nationalism in such a context is not politi-
cal. Id.
68. Id. at 105. The general difference between nationalism and politics is found in the
following:
Nationalism might well be explained as the enhancing of the total reputa-
tion of a country through sport success because the citizens' pride is heightened
and the world's respect is promoted. Politics, in contrast, is the increase of a
nation's international power and influence in both sport and nonsport activities
by the manipulation of the sporting event.
Id. (emphasis in original).
69. See infra Section Legitimate Uses of Sport for Political Ends and accompanying
text.
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tion of the Modern Olympic Games in 1896,70 and in other athletic
events between individuals of different countries long before 1896.7
"Any time a contest takes place between athletes of different coun-
tries, nationalism must be a factor in the competition. ' 72 National-
ism in and of itself is not a problem, especially when it enhances the
patriotic feelings of a country towards its representative athletes and
acts as "a positive virtue and a cohesive political force."' 73 National
pride experienced by competitors and spectators due to an athlete's
success is a natural and healthy aspect of the Olympic Games.74
Problems arise, however, when nationalistic feelings, aroused by
sport, are used to exert political pressure, resulting in countries sub-
stituting the successes of athletes in competition for successes in the
political arena. 5
Although it had every intention of keeping nationalism and
politicization out of the Olympic arena,76 the IOC itself breeds na-
tionalism in both its structure and organization. 7 The Olympic rules
contain an "inherent paradox"78 between nationalism and interna-
tionalism. While stating that the Games are contests between indi-
viduals and not between countries, the rules also assert that athletes
represent their respective states, and that individuals are admitted to
the Games only through their state's National Olympic Commit-
tee.79 The athletes, therefore, have no choice but to identify with the
country and organization that they are representing.
Furthermore, an athlete is not permitted to represent one coun-
70. Toohey and Warning, supra note 65, at 118. Nationalism was even displayed by the
delegates at the Sorbonne Meeting in 1894, convened for the purpose of recreating the
Olympic Games. Id.
71. Leiper, supra note 66, at 106. "Solon, the archon of Athens in the early 6th century
BC, legislated a reward of 500 drachmas for every Athenian who won at the ancient Olympics
in an effort to increase Athens' image." H.A. HARRIS, GREEK ATHLETES AND ATHLETICS,
noted in id.
72. Leiper, supra note 66, at 106 (emphasis in original).
73. Toohey and Warning, supra note 65, at 118-19.
74. Id. at 119.
75. Id. The Soviet Union substituted its success in receiving host-nation status of the
1980 Summer Games as a political success in world recognition. The Soviet Union viewed its
grant by the IOC of host-nation status as an endorsement of the Soviet foreign policy. 80
DEP'T ST. BULL. Special D (1980).
76. Toohey and Warning, supra note 65, at 119, 120.
77. Id. at 119.
When an organization structures itself in terms of other organizational enti-
ties (e.g., international sport in terms of nation-states), the facets of other orga-
nizations (the nation-state) become a part of the first organization (international
sport). Since politics is a facet of nation-states, politics becomes a part of inter-
national sport. The only way to divorce politics from international sport is to
alter the organizational structure of sport.
R. Espy, supra note 21, at 164.
78. See discussion in Nafziger, Transnational Sports, supra note 1.
79. Toohey and Warning, supra note 65, at 120. The athletes, citizens of the state which
they are representing, must be affiliated with the NOC and the sports organizations of that
state. R. Espy, supra note 21, at 169.
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 6:3
try in the Games when he or she had previously represented another
country.8" For example, after World War II, many athletes fled to
the United States or elsewhere because of the presence of Soviet
forces in Eastern Europe. These athletes wanted to participate in the
1952 and 1956 Games "as athletes, as individuals, behind the
Olympic flag, or in whatever way was possible."81 The IOC prohib-
ited their participation in the Games. IOC officials refused to modify
the Olympic rules so strongly rooted in the nation-state system of
organization, not even for the purpose of allowing some of the
world's top athletes to compete for athletic honors.82
Similarly, the IOC would not permit athletes whose National
Olympic Committee had pulled out of the Montreal Games for polit-
ical reasons to compete. "Even when in sympathy with such athletes,
the IOC cannot challenge NOC control over team selection, and
therefore cannot alter the political character of its own
organization." 83
The traditional ceremonial hoopla that takes place even before
the actual contests begin, injects nationalistic feelings into the atmo-
sphere of the Games.8" The playing of the victor's national anthem
during the medal ceremonies is another instance when winning ath-
letes and spectators experience national pride.8 5 In addition, many
spectators spread their national feelings by wearing the colors of
their respective country's flag, or by displaying their nation's flag in
buttons, clothing, and other paraphernalia.86
80. Id. at 168-69.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 169. The question of modifying the rules to allow participation of these ath-
letes was submitted to the Council of Europe, which agreed with the exiled athletes. The IOC,
however, refused to alter the rules on this issue because it was contrary to the established
organizational structure, which is firmly based on the nation-state system. Consequently, the
IOC persisted in its refusal to permit the athletes to participate in the Games. Id.
83. Kanin, supra note 7, at 530-31.
84. Toohey and Warning, supra note 65, at 120-21. For instance, at the opening cere-
monies, the athletes march into the arena nation by nation, under their national flags, display-
ing team colors. Id. The creator of the Modern Olympic Games, Pierre de Coubertin, wrote
shortly after the first Modern Games of 1896: "One may be filled with a desire to see the
colors of one's club or college triumph in a national meeting, but how much stronger is the
feeling when the colors of one's own country are at stake ... !" Id. at 120.
85. Id. at 121. During medal ceremonies, the national flags of the three medalists are
raised, and the national anthem of the winner's country is played. Id. Former IOC president
Avery Brundage made several unsuccessful attempts to end the nationalism in the medal cere-
monies during his presidency in the 1950s and 1960s. Leiper, supra note 66, at 108.
86.
Prestige is inherent in any major international sporting event, because great
importance is attributed to the competition by the athletes, the governments, and
the spectators. For the spectators it is highly significant to have the team win or
the nation triumph, to feel vicarious identification with the individual athlete and
their successes or failures. In the 1976 Games when Mac Wilkins, the American
world-record-holding discus thrower and eventual Olympic champion, embraced
the second-place East German for a particularly good throw instead of his own
third-place teammate, the American press and public were aghast condemning
Wilkin's act as nearly treasonous.
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The closing ceremony presents a curious contrast to the egocen-
tric nationalism of the preceding weeks. Since 1956, the practice has
been for the athletes to join together and march out of the arena as
one team.87 Symbolically, the true goal of the Olympic Games is
realized in these final moments.
Yet, despite these final few moments of togetherness, each na-
tion-state promotes a number of interests peculiar in character and
importance to its socio-political structure. As such, nations have dif-
fering reasons for sending athletes and athletic teams to compete in
international athletic competitions. The People's Republic of China
competes in international competition primarily to form friendships
and to learn good techniques.88 Countries in parts of the Middle East
and Middle Asia limit participation in sports to men. Often those in
the military, the affluent, and the professional elite are the only citi-
zens permitted to compete. 9 Women and those in the lower eco-
nomic classes are excluded, typifying the caste system of these na-
tions. The goal of the United States government in supporting
international sports programs is to further "mutual understanding
and communication." 90 Eastern European nations have used athletic
competition as a tool to gain world recognition, and other nations
seek economic gains from sports participation.91
Whatever the reasons for a country's supporting its sports'
teams in international competition, teams become its diplomatic rep-
resentatives, identifying and honoring the ideologies and values of
the society and nation they represent. Governments are generally
proud of the athletes who are sent to foreign territories for represen-
tation in athletic competition."2
Sports have effectively been used as a diplomatic device by a
few countries. The Peoples' Republic of China has conducted "peo-
ples diplomacy" or "ping-pong diplomacy" as a means of establish-
R. Espy, supra note 21, at 7.
87. Toohey and Warning, supra note 65, at 121.
88. Nafziger, U.S. Sports Policy, supra note 28, at 849.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 845-46. The U.S. also practices people-to-people communication and has given
monetary support to encourage public diplomacy as used by private individuals and groups. Id.
at 846.
91. Id. at 272.
92. Sometimes these athletes even have a duty of spreading the ideology to people they
come in contact with, especially to the other competing teams. For instance,
"The overriding principle [of socialist states' international sporting rela-
tions] consists in developing relations between fraternal Community workers'
parties which control physical culture and sport and formulate the foreign policy
tasks of the national sports organizations." Sports contacts "help to strengthen
fraternal cooperation and friendship and develop a sense of patriotism and inter-
nationalism among young people of the socialist states."
Riordan, Soviet Sport and Soviet Foreign Policy in SPORT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
316, 331 (B. Lowe, D. Kanin, and A. Strenk eds. 1978).
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ing diplomatic relations with the United States.9" By making its dip-
lomatic overtures in such an innocent setting, the Chinese succeeded
in de-emphasizing the underlying political motives for their hospital-
ity. Through peoples diplomacy, they set in motion and laid the
foundation for political recognition by the United States and the de-
velopment of diplomatic relations on a nation-state level. 9 '
The Soviet Union also uses sport as a means of attaining na-
tional goals. The main purpose for international sports participation
of the Soviet Union:
is to consolidate the authority of the Soviet Union by ensur-
ing that Soviet athletes play a leading role internationally, that
their sports skill instantly grows, that the successes of the Soviet
people in building communism are made widely known and that
physical culture and sport are promoted in our country. 5
Soviet athletes serve as symbols of goodwill in order to set the stage
for peaceful negotiations with a foreign nation.96 Thus, prior to a
scheduled meeting with a foreign government, the Soviets will par-
ticipate in a sports festival or an athlete exchange with that coun-
try's athletes, in which the negotiating country's athletes compete to
lighten the mood for the negotiations.9
As demonstrated by the preceding examples, sport can be used
to promote diplomatic relations through two-nation competition, as
93. Nafziger, Transnational Sports, supra note 1, at 204-05. The United States table
tennis team accepted an invitation extended by the government of the Peoples' Republic of
China to visit Mainland China in 1971. This is the first official invitation to U.S. citizens from
the Peking government since its establishment. The visit successfully led to a visit by the Chi-
nese team to the United States after an official invitation of the Nixon government. Ping-pong
was chosen as the activity in which the teams were to compete, as well as to share skills and
techniques for two reasons: first, ping-pong creates minimal tension, and second, national pres-
tige is only loosely tied to athletic success in such a sport. Id.
94. Id. The success of the Peoples' Republic of China's ping-pong diplomacy resulted in
U.S. President Richard Nixon's accepting an invitation to visit China. Id. at 204. The Syrian
government also became involved in the use of bilateral sports competition for diplomatic rela-
tions when it invited a U.S. basketball team to participate in an international basketball tour-
nament in August, 1971, as one step towards improving U.S.-Syrian relations. Id. at 206.
95. Riordan, supra note 92, at 329.
96. Id.
97. Id. For example, prior to President Richard Nixon's visit to Moscow, and during a
period of important negotiations between the two countries, the Soviet leaders sent their top
women gymnasts, including Olga Korbut and Ludmilla Turishcheva, on a gymnastics tour of
America. The success of the gymnastics tour led to the inclusion of a clause on sports ex-
changes in the USA-USSR Treaty on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation signed in Moscow
two months later. Id. Section XI of the Agreement between the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics in Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific, Techni-
cal, Educational, Cultural and Other Fields in 1972-1973 contains the following provision on
sports:
1. The Parties agree to encourage reciprocal exchanges of athletes and
athletic teams as well as visits of specialists in the fields of physical education
and sports.
2. These exchanges and visits will be agreed upon between the appropriate
United States and Soviet sports organizations.
INTERNATIONAL SPORTS
well as through world competitions such as the Olympics. The use of
sport to achieve the specific goals of a nation is most effective on a
bilateral level." The contacts between two nations on the athletic
field can bring the two together, thereby offering an opportunity for
government leaders to broaden and strengthen their economic and
social ties with each other. Within the Olympic arena, "the lack of
bilateral confrontation and the diffusion of actors and types of en-
counter renders directed bilateral diplomacy almost impossible."99
This is not to say, however, that governments cannot and do not use
the multi-national sporting events, especially the Olympic Games, as
means to establish contacts with other countries.
B. Sport for Political Goals
Athletic events can be efficiently employed to combat problems
or to attain political goals.100 States have used international sporting
events for the following reasons: (1) to gain national/political recog-
nition and prestige;10 1 (2) to combat human rights problems, such as
racial discrimination; 102 (3) to foster international cooperation,10 31
and (4) to spread ideology or propaganda.'" Excessive use of sport
for political purposes within the parameters of international law has
often resulted in the exploitation and abuse of sport as a bargaining
chip.
1. Recognition and Non-Recognition of Nations.--One of the
most common uses or abuses '0 5 of athletic competition has been in
granting or denying diplomatic recognition. When a nation decides
to engage in international sports competition, it represents to other
countries participating that it formally recognizes their existence. A
refusal to permit its athletes to participate is thus equated with dip-
lomatic nonrecognition. °0
98. Nafziger, Transnational Sports, supra note 1, at 206.
99. Id. Both forms of athletic participation, bilateral and multi-lateral, remain effective
diplomatic tools because: "the minimal impact that the Olympic model may have for the pro-
motion of friendly relations among nation-states should not diminish expectations that other
forums of sports competition, particularly bilateral ones, will continue to serve as relatively low
risk, face-saving vehicles of rapprochment." Id.
100. See generally SPORTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (B. Lowe, D. Kanin, and
A. Strenk eds. 1978); Nafziger, Transnational Sports, supra note 1; and Nafziger and Strenk,
supra note 34.
101. See infra notes 105-14; 172-79 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 122-32; 189-96 and accompanying text.
103. See infra text accompanying note 163.
104. See supra note 97.
105. For example, an abuse of sports by non-recognition occurs when a national team
officially recognized by the IOC is not permitted to participate in an Olympic event because
the host government does not formally recognize that nation. See infra notes 178-88 and ac-
companying text for a recent example of such an abuse of sport by the Canadian government.
106. Nafziger and Strenk, supra note 34, at 261.
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One example of a country using sports to gain diplomatic recog-
nition is the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). Shortly
after World War II, many countries did not recognize two separate
German states, harboring the belief that Germany would become re-
unified within the near future.10 7 As a consequence, nations that rec-
ognized West Germany refused to allow East German athletes to
enter and compete in sporting events within their boundaries."'
The granting of visas to East German athletes to participate in
sport competitions was a slow uphill battle. 9 The process began in
1949, when the East German Soccer Team competed against a Hun-
garian "labor union" team, and demonstrated its existence as an "in-
dependent political entity capable of conducting cultural relations
with other countries.""' The process culminated in 1972, when the
IOC allowed East Germany to compete in international sporting
events under its own emblems."'
In the period between 1949 and 1972, the East German govern-
ment actively sought formal diplomatic recognition through sports
by expending a lot of time and money on its athletic programs. This
expenditure took shape through the construction of new sports facili-
ties and national training centers, the training of coaches, and the
awarding of financial and other material aid for excellence in
sports." 2 Due to this commitment, East German athletes excelled in
so many sporting events that they could no longer be excluded from
competing against other world class athletes." 3 As a consequent of
this lawful use of sport for political goals, other nations concluded
that East Germany was a viable and stable government warranting
formal diplomatic recognition.""
107. Id. at 262. During this time, West Germany also used sports as a diplomatic tool.
With its ultimate goal of reunification of the two Germanys, West Germany stepped into the
shoes of pre-war Germany within the IOC and international sports federations. East Germany
had the choice of either being represented by West Germany in international sporting organi-
zations or of stepping out of international sporting events. East Germany chose to fight for
recognition. Id.
108. For example, the NATO powers refused to participate in sports with East Ger-
many. Id. at 263.
109. Id. at 263-64. "East German athletes competed anywhere they were recognized as
East German athletes on the program." Id. at 263. From 1957 to 1967, East Germany was
refused visas on thirty-five different occasions, and frequently refused to participate with West
Germany. Id. at 263 n.13.
110. Id. at 262. The Hungarians described their athletes as a "labor union" team simply
because East Germany was not a member of the international soccer federation (FIFA). Id.
111. Id. at 263-64. In 1955, the IOC granted the East Germans provisional recognition,
allowing them to compete on a team with the West Germans in the 1956, 1960, and 1964
Olympic Games. In the 1968 Mexico City Games, the two Germanys sent separate teams but
participated under a common flag. Id. at 263.
112. Id. at 265.
113. Id. at 263.
114. East Germany continues to use sport against West Germany despite the Four
Power Agreement of 1971 between the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the
U.S.S.R. Id. at 264-65. The relevant provisions of Part I of the Four Power Agreement of
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In contrast to the use of sports for recognitional purposes, the
use of sports for nonrecognition is looked upon with disfavor. In the
process of furthering its relations with the Peoples' Republic of
China, the Canadian government engaged in the use of sport for dip-
lomatic nonrecognition of the Republic of China.1 5 The controversy
involved the Republic of China and the Peoples' Republic of China,
with the Peoples' Republic of China prohibiting their athletes from
taking part in international competition if the "other China's" ath-
letes were participating. 1 6 The problem climaxed at the 1976 Mon-
treal Games, when the Canadian government, at the last minute, re-
fused to admit athletes of the Republic of China so long as they
competed under any symbolic representation of China, such as its
flag or national anthem.11 7 The athletes would be permitted entrance
if they participated under the designation of "Taiwan.""' 8 The Re-
public of China refused to compete as "Taiwan," and subsequently
withdrew from the Games. The Canadian government's decision was
opposed by the IOC, its member federations, and the United
States. 19 Canada, however, insisted that it was following official
government policy. 2' Regardless of Canada's reasons for its actions,
it failed to consider the purposes of the Olympic Games and the ide-
als that the athletes are the key figures in the Games. 2'
1971 are as follows:
1. The four Governments will strive to promote the elimination of tension
and the prevention of complications in the relevant area.
2. The four Governments taking into account their obligations under the
Charter of the United Nations, agree that there shall be no use or threat of
force in the area and that disputes shall be settled solely by peaceful means.
Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin 1971, 24 U.S.T. 203, T.I.A.S. No. 7551.
115. Nafziger and Strenk, supra note 34, at 265-66. The Canadian government was
following "its 1970 decision to accord diplomatic recognition to the Peoples' Republic of China
and to withdraw recognition from the Republic" of China. Id. at 266.
116. Id. at 265. In 1958, the Peoples' Republic of China withdrew from the IOC, be-
cause the IOC extended recognition to the Republic of China. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 266.
120. Id. Allan J. MacEacheu, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs stated
on July 16, 1976:
We have not accepted [the Peoples Republic's] views, which asked us to
prohibit totally the admission of Taiwanese athletes under any circumstances.
That we were not prepared to do. We were prepared to admit the athletes if they
accepted a designation that was compatible with our national policy on China.
Canadian Embassy, Public Affairs Division, CANADA REPORT, July 22, 1976, at 3, noted in
Nafziger and Strenk, supra note 34, at 265 n.27.
121.
The central ideal of the Olympics was peaceful competition, and the central
protagonist was the athlete. A last minute refusal of entry over something so
trivial as a name was diametrically opposed to the central value of the Games. It
destroyed all that the athlete had worked for and it lacked humanitarian
concern.
R. ESPY, supra note 21, at 155.
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2. Promoting Peace and Human Rights.-Underlying the con-
cept of using sport to gain political recognition is the notion of work-
ing towards international cooperation through sport. International
peace and friendship are part of the Olympic ideals122 and remain a
part of international sporting events. More importantly the interac-
tion of the athletes before, during, and after the actual contests is a
primary concern. 2' Athletes of different cultures are involved in a
similar experience and can communicate with each other on a non-
nationalistic level. Once contacts are established through sports and
international ties strengthened through further athletic exchanges
and contests between the nations, the door of opportunity is opened
for these nations to meet and negotiate on other, more important
world concerns.
One concern that has been seriously addressed in the sports
arena is the protection of human rights and the eradication of racial
discrimination and apartheid.12 4 The persistence of the problem has
forced states to realize that the athlete, the individual, is the most
important player in the sports world. Through the cooperation of
many nations and applicable IOC rules concerning the practice of
apartheid, sport has been effectively used to compel governments of
nations such as South Africa and Rhodesia to alter their apartheid
policies in sports,12 5 thus allowing all individual athletes to compete,
regardless of race.
The existence of apartheid in South African sports has led to
the use of protests, boycotts and other pressure tools to force the
South African government to change its policies on racial segrega-
tion in sports. 12 6 Because of this, sports play an all-important role in
preserving South Africa's presence on the international scene. Thus,
South Africa's acceptance in the international sports community has
become an obsession, especially since South Africa has recently been
122. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
123. Nafziger and Strenk, supra note 34, at 275. Ideally, the exposure of athletes of
different cultures to each other will produce the following results: "Cultural bias and precon-
ceptions will disappear as understanding and cooperation replace fear and distrust. Sports ex-
changes will afford an opportunity to understand the values of other cultures, and will foster a
sense of communality." Id.
124. Apartheid is defined as "An official policy of racial segregation practiced in the
Republic of South Africa." WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 34 (5th ed. 1984);
Apartheid means not only that sport is practiced separately by different ra-
cial groups but also that sports opportunities and resources for white are vastly
superior to those provided for other races. Sport is almost a religion in White
South Africa; meanwhile, non-white facilities are minimal and blacks have been
excluded from international teams.
Shaw and Shaw, Sport as Transnational Politics: A Preliminary Analysis of Africa, in
OLYMPISM 386 (J. Segrave and D. Chu eds. 1981).
125. Nafziger, Transnational Sports, supra note 1, at 207-10.
126. Id. A boycott was threatened by thirty-two nations if South African athletes were
permitted to compete in the 1968 Mexico City Games. Id. at 207.
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condemned in international political circles.1" Participation in the
Olympic Games and Regional Games, therefore, is a top priority of
the South African government. 128
Due to the overwhelming opposition to the apartheid policies of
South Africa in sports as well as on a society-wide basis, a large
number of countries ceased competing with South African ath-
letes.12 9 Isolation of South Africa from the international sports com-
munity was taking its toll on the South African government and
sports participants. Thus, beginning in 1969, the South African offi-
cials realizing the need for changes in their country's apartheid poli-
cies, began to make plans for a change.130 These changes, however,
have been extremely slow in coming to fruition.
As a consequence of the importance with which the success of
South African athletes is viewed by their government, the use of in-
ternational sports to effect changes in South African government
policy has been relatively successful.131 While South African athletes
are the victims of the political uses of sport against apartheid in the
short run,132 in the long run, a victory against racially discriminatory
policies will benefit athletes and many other potential victims. 133
3. Terrorism as a Political Tool.-Terrorism is a recent world
threat that caught the sports world by surprise in Munich at the
1972 Summer Olympic Games. There, Arab terrorists stole into the
Olympic Village at night and took nine Israeli athletes hostage, kill-
ing two others.1 34 During a rescue attempt by West German police,
all nine Israelis and five terrorists died.133 The terrorists, members of
the Black September organization had hoped "to further Palestinian
127. Lapchick, Apartheid Sport: South Africa's Use of Sport in Its Foreign Policy, in
SPORT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 369, 371 (B. Lowe, D. Kanin and A. Strenk eds.
1978). IOC acceptance of South Africa is translated by the South African government to its
people as acceptance of its apartheid policies in international circles, despite United Nations
Resolutions to the contrary. Id. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
128. Nafziger, Transnational Sports, supra note 1, at 208.
129. Lapchick, supra note 127, at 379. In addition, by 1970, approximately eighty-nine
nations actively opposed South Africa's right to international sports participation. Id.
130. Nafziger, Transnational Sports, supra note 1, at 207; see also infra notes 189-96
and accompanying text.
131. Lapchick, supra note 127, at 380.
132. Id. at 380. The Johannesburg Sunday Times, on May 31, 1970, stated concerning
the attack on South Africa through sports:
South Africa's critics have simply discovered that sport is the most useful
weapon they have yet found with which to beat us and while it is the sportsmen
who are the sacrificial victims - they are being ostracized and deprived of the
right to participate in world sport - the main target of attack is the racial




134. Nafziger and Strenk, supra note 34, at 277.
135. Id. at 277-78.
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recognition through a stunning propaganda coup at a major sporting
event."'
Terrorism is a very real problem in the sports arena, as well as
in the everyday world. Deaths due to terrorist acts continue to rise
each year. 37 The Olympic Games, Regional Games and other major
sporting events'38 are prime targets for terrorists wishing to make a
statement. Not only are millions of people present at the actual
event, but millions of people are following the Games on television as
well. Since the Munich tragedy, people have become more aware of
the vulnerable position of athletes traveling abroad for athletic com-
petition. The athletes look to their country for matters of safety. If
the athletes themselves must be concerned about their safety, many
would decide not to compete in foreign territories. A number of
teams and individual athletes have already made the difficult deci-
sion to forego 'competition in a foreign country because of threats to
safety." 9
Because of the prime opportunities for terrorist groups to make
statements, and the fact that athletes look to the host country to
account for their safety, security precautions have often been a ma-
jor concern.'40 The upcoming 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul,
South Korea will be no exception. Indeed, the games are "shaping
up as the most heavily fortified sporting event in history."" 1
136. Id. at 277.
137. Hatch, Fighting Back Against Terrorism: When, Where and How?, 13 OHIo
N.U.L. REV. 5, 6 (1986). The number of international terrorist attacks throughout the globe in
recent years is frightening - "more than 600 in 1984 and 812 for 1985, approximately one-
quarter of which occurred in European countries. In fact, half of the worldwide terrorist acts
during this decade have been aimed at just 10 countries, and one-third of that total had the
United States as a direct target." Id.
138. The Super Bowl in the United States and the World Cup Soccer Championships
are two major events in the professional sporting world which draw a world audience.
139. Hatch, supra note 137, at 8. Many American teams and individual athletes decided
not to compete abroad because of terrorist threats:
The United States Tennis Association decided to keep the U.S. junior tennis
players from competing at the Italian Open, the French Open, and the prestigi-
ous Wimbledon tournament. The Phoenix Suns professional basketball team
withdrew from a trip to Bulgaria where they were to conduct a series of basket-
ball clinics. Trips to Europe have been called off by the Abderdeen, Washington
basketball allstars; a champion U.S. gymnast; the DePauw University football
team; the Rollins College basketball team; the University of North Carolina bas-
ketball team; an American cycling team; and several American professional golf-
ers, among others. Security arrangements were unprecedents at the May, 1986,
Italian Open with armed guards stationed at each corner of the court during the
final tennis matches in Rome.
Id. at 8.
140. See supra text accompanying note 46 for a discussion of security's role in the
choosing of a site.
141. Haberman, Seoul Olympic Rings Include Some Made of Barbed Wire, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 18, 1988, at A33, col. I. The security precautions taken will consist of:
1. the South Korean armed forces of 620,000 and the national police force
of 120,000 being placed on full alert to protect an estimated 34,000 athletes,
officials, journalists and technicians;
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Given the potential for political intrigue, pressure, and even vio-
lence, it is critical that international sporting events be carefully reg-
ulated to guard against goals extrinsic to the competition. As will be
seen, the framework of the Olympic Movement provides an effective
but, at times, insufficient mechanism for addressing these concerns.
IV. Legal Analysis of Politics in International Sports
Sports and athletic activities conducted on an international basis
are subject to the laws of the international sports legal system. Inter-
national sports law is governed by the rules and regulations of the
International Olympic Committee, " 2 the international sports federa-
tions, and United Nations authority. 3 Athletic activities that are
within the Olympic System, as well as other sporting events con-
ducted between foreign athletes and teams, fall under the jurisdic-
tion of at least one of these law-making authorities.
The legal framework of the Olympic System revolves around
the Olympic Charter,144 which lays out the rules and regulations of
Olympic participants, and the IOC, which is the final authority on
all Olympic matters.1" The IOC, which has juridical status and per-
petual succession under international law, administrates the rules of
the Olympic Charter. 14  The Olympic Charter and various ministe-
rial and protocol provisions comprise the Olympic Rules and Regu-
lations, a document that also includes the organizational rules, and
Eligibility Code and its decisions.14 7 According to the Olympic Char-
ter "[e]very person or organization that plays any part whatsoever in
the Olympic movement shall accept the supreme authority of the
IOC and shall be bound by its Rules and submit to its jurisdic-
2. more than 30,000 specially hired security guards, being posted at train-
ing areas, hotels, and other potential targets;
3. the 40,000 American soldiers stationed in South Korea being placed on
alert;
4. several aircraft carriers cruising off the South Korean coast;
5. aircraft and satellite surveillance increasing;
6. the use of 117,000 gadgets, including TV cameras, metal detectors and
x-ray machines that will be able to detect plastic explosives, in Olympic Park;
7. the use of a special terminal at the airport for the athletes;
8. the placement of an electric fence around the entire Olympic Park;
9. the placement of three concrete fences around the Athlete's Village
within the Olympic Park;
10. the use of police dogs to sniff out explosives; and
II. the patrolling of troops toting machine guns outside key locations.
Id. at col. 1-2.
142. The Olympic Charter contains the rules and regulations of the Olympic Movement.
143. Nafziger and Strenk, supra note 34, at 279.
144. Krotee, at 212. The Olympic Charter was adopted in Montevideo, Uruguay, in
April of 1979. Id.
145. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
146. Nafziger, Nonaggressive Sanctions, supra note 19, at 332.
147. Nafziger, Transnational Sports, supra note 1, at 190. The document consists of
"basic law" provisions, rules, norms and a few admonitions. Id. at 190-91.
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tion."' 48 The IOC insures that the rules are observed, interprets the
rules, and applies penalties to organizations and individuals under its
jurisdiction.149 Although the IOC is non-governmental and cannot in
itself compel state obedience, its rules, as provided by the Olympic
Charter, are evidence of international custom pertaining to sports
competition.150
The rules of law in sport are laid down by an authority distinct
from the usual legislature. Moreover, due to the fact that the rule-
making officials are elected from within the Olympic Movement or
the international federations, and not through politics in the member
countries, the rules of law guiding international sports are formu-
lated independently of specific nations' concerns and priorities.15' Be-
cause participation in international sports is voluntary, participating
nations and individuals submit themselves to the rule of law and au-
thority of the governing bodies, agreeing to obey their rules and reg-
ulations or be subject to penalties and sanctions for disobedience to
them. Consequently, "[t]he sports juridical system is applied in pref-
erence to the state juridical system. ''152 The authoritative force of
the rules and regulations of sports organizations are recognized by
both state and international law.
1 53
A. Regulating the Force of Nationalistic Sentiment
The presence of national flags and other national symbols in the
Olympic Games is part of the Olympic tradition. Each nation or
state has various interests creating differing levels of importance that
148. Olympic Charter, at Rule 4 (1983) noted in Nafziger, Nonaggressive Sanctions,
supra note 19, at 333.
149. Krotee, Sociological Perspectives of the Olympic Games, in OLYMPISM 207 (J.
Segrave and D. Chu eds. 1981). Under the Olympic Charter, technical disputes such as dis-
qualifications, timekeeping, etc., are settled by a jury, appointed by the international federa-
tion for each sport. Rule 40, Olympic Rules and Regulations (1971), noted in id. at 191. All
controversies of a non-technical nature must be submitted to the IOC Executive Board by a
national committee, an international federation or the organizing committee of the city hosting
the Games. Rule 15, Olympic Rules and Regulations I1 (1971), noted in Krotee, supra note
21, at 191.
150. Nafziger, Nonaggressive Sanctions, supra note 19, at 332-33. For example:
A 1977 Belgian court decision, confirming the position of the French courts,
the Council of Europe, and the High Court of Justice of the European Commu-
nities, ruled that the international rules of sport supersede conflicting national
policies and laws. The Second Conference of European Sports Ministers adopted
a resolution that explicitly confirmed the authority of the Olympic Charter. Fur-
thermore, leading publicists have established the authority of the Olympic Rules
in the international sports arena.
Nafziger, Foreign Policy, supra note 32 at 259 n.22; see also Silance, Interaction of the Rules
in Sports Law and the Laws and Treaties Made by Public Authorities, OLYMPIC REv. 619,
622, 627 (1977).
151. Silance, supra note 150 at 622.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 628.
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it wishes to promote by supporting sport at the international level." 4
When a nation is successful in international competition, the effect is
used to bring the people of the country closer together, as well as to
further the political objectives of the country. 5 The use of national-
ism for general diplomatic and recognitional purposes is not necessa-
rily contrary to Olympic ideals, and awareness of such use is ac-
knowledged by the Olympic Charter.156  While nationalism is
strongly encouraged by the Olympic Movement, and in itself does
not cause abuses of sport for political purposes, nationalism may be
used by governments for purposes that are contrary to the Olympic
ideals, or in violation of Olympic rules and regulations.
Nationalism plays a lesser role in individual Olympic events,
where respect and goodwill are more likely to be exchanged between
the individuals of foreign nations. 5 However, in team sports, na-
tionalism is more likely to play a dominant role.' 58 Sports teams
from rival countries meeting in competition are likely to experience
an increased level of stress and tension because a country's national
prestige and honor is at stake.'5 9 Because nationalism is a part of
sport the potential is ripe for rule violations and abuses of sport. For
this reason, international sporting contests within the Olympic Sys-
tem must be tightly regulated.
One major premise upon which Olympic sport is based is that
154. Nafziger, U.S. Sports Policy, supra note 28, at 848-49.Individuals may be culturally conditioned to participate actively or passively
for a variety of diverse reasons: for aesthetic pleasure related to the beauty of
controlled body movement, for dramatics and strategy-interplay, for the sheer
excitement of competition, for the thrill of physical exertion or even violence
within the rules, or for the experience of learning. The controlling perspectives
will depend on the sport, the age, sex, and other characteristics of the partici-
pants, the level and intensity of competition, the type of exchange, and most
importantly, the cultural context.
Id.
155. See generally, Kanin, supra note 7; Nafziger, U.S. Sports Policy, supra note 28;
Nafziger, Nonaggressive Sanctions, supra note 19; and Nafziger, Transnational Sports, supra
note 1.
156. Note, supra note 29, at 163. The IOC also recognizes the dangers to Olympic
ideals presented by national feelings in the Olympic Movement "instead of the realisation that
the sharing of friendly effort and rivalry is the essential aim of the Olympic Games." Olympic
Charter instruction 1 (1980), noted in id. at 163.
157. Nafziger, Transnational Sports, supra note 1, at 200-01. One example of goodwill
overshadowing nationalism in Olympic Competition is "the crucial assistance that was given to
Jesse Owens by his chief competitor in the broad jump in the politically-charged 1936 Olym-
pics." Id. at 201.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 200.
The thousands of spectators, and sometimes the players as well, seem to
behold a mighty contest between their country and the enemy. The national
prestige is at stake; a victory is no longer the success of the team that could play
better but becomes a national victory and is an occasion for national rejoicings,
out of all proportion with reality. Such an attitude is not favorable to interna-
tional understanding.
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the Games are between individuals and not countries.160 While team
members are considered representatives of their country,"' the gov-
ernment of each country is to play no part whatsoever in the selec-
tion of the team or in the structure of the team. Team selection is
conducted by the National Olympic Committee," 2 and the govern-
ment is not permitted to appoint any of its members. Furthermore,
the rules call for strict adherence to these principles.
B. Legitimate Uses of Sport For Political Ends
Nations can, and do, however, manipulate sports to their advan-
tage after teams are selected and are participating in international
events. The use of a country's sports teams to advance relations with
another nation or to "recognize" ' 6 3 the government of another nation
is encouraged. The use of sport by the Peoples' Republic of China
for ping-pong diplomacy164 to strengthen relations with the United
States is a valid use of sport as well as an effective diplomatic tool.
The Chinese had subordinated any nation-state feelings that might
have been present during the ping-pong tournament with the United
States to emphasize people-to-people relations. The Chinese, there-
fore, succeeded in providing a politically harmless setting so that the
athletes, coaches, and government officials could establish contacts
with a former adversary and set the stage for future meetings be-
tween the two governments.6 5 The Peoples' Republic of China suc-
ceeded by playing within the rules of international sports.
The Soviet Union's use of sport in trying to establish contacts
with other nations may be just as effective if the Soviets do not over-
step the bounds of the rules with regard to their reasons for using
sports. The Soviets plan athletic tours and exchanges, as both a
goodwill gesture and to lighten the mood before a visit or a meeting
with officials of a foreign government. 66 These tours and exchanges
are appropriate diplomatic uses of sports, and are thus received with
approval by the international community.
C. Illegitimate Use of Sport for Political Ends
Despite the Soviet Union's successful use of sports within the
boundaries of international law, the potential exists for Soviet ideol-
160. Id. at 202. Rule 8, OLYMPIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 11 (1971), noted in id. at
202.
161. See supra text accompanying note 79.
162. See supra text accompanying note 30.
163. See supra text accompanying note 101.
164. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
165. Nafziger, Transnational Sports, supra note 1, at 205.
166. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. For example, Soviet gymnasts toured
the United States prior to a visit to the Soviet Union by President Richard Nixon. Riordan,
supra note 92, at 329.
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ogy to conflict with Olympic ideals.167 In the Soviet view of sports, a
success in an athletic contest against an adversary is a point for the
Soviet government and for the Soviet way of life.1 8 This view is not
only contrary to the Olympic ideals, but also indicates possible viola-
tions of international sports law and custom. Rule 8 of the Olympic
Rules and Regulations states that the Olympic Games are between
individuals and not countries; Rule 44 states that the "Olympics are
not contests between nations and no scoring by countries is recog-
nized." 1 9 Both of these rules dictate that governments are not to
interfere with the administration of the athletic programs in their
countries. Yet the Soviet government prepares its athletes for
Olympic and other international sports competition. Any victories of
its athletes are thus victories for the Soviet Union. In Soviet eyes,
the goals of international sports competition are not to promote in-
ternational sportsmanship, the promotion of friendly contests be-
tween athletes, or the recognition of personal achievements. They are
to assert the superiority of the Soviet way of life. 7
167. See generally id. A few of the duties of Soviet sports organizations are as follows:
I. to ensure top performance by Soviet athletes abroad as a means of
widely publicising our attainments in building communism and in promoting
physical culture and sport and to gain a prominent position internationally in the
major sports;
2. systematically to propagate the aims and tasks of the Soviet sports
movement, to explain the attitudes of Soviet sports organizations [sic) to the
principal problems confronting the international sports movement, vigorously to
combat slander, and misinformation in regard to Soviet sport, anti-communism
and ideological diversions made by imperialist circles in world sport, to expose
the real nature of bourgeois sport and the strategy and tactics of bourgeois
sports organisations, [sic] to thwart actions directed against the sports organisa-
tions [sic] of the Soviet Union and of other socialist and young independent
states;
3. to unite progressive forces in the international sports movement, to con-
solidate the united front of sports organisations [sic] of the socialist states, of the
young independent states and the workers' sports organisations [sic] in capitalist
states for the purpose of reaching progressive decisions on issues facing the inter-
national sports movement and of using sport as a weapon in the campaign for
peace and mutual understanding.
Id. at 317.
168. Edwards, Crisis in the Modern Olympic Movement, in OLYMPIsM 227, 232 (J.
Segrave and D. Chu eds. 1981).
169. Rule 8; Rule 14, noted in Nafziger, Transnational Sports, supra note 1, at 202 n.3.
170. Clumpner, Federal Involvement in Sport to Promote American Interests or For-
eign Policy Objectives - 1950-1973, in SPORT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 400, 402 (B.
Lowe, D. Kanin, and A. Strenk, eds. 1978). The Soviet athletes competing in the Olympics
have been criticized as being professionals:
The Soviet Athlete is as much a pawn in the vast Soviet mechanism as any
other segment of the total Soviet proletariat. He is not an individual. He has no
independence. He is anything but a free agent. His only right is the right to
obey. And his duty is simple and absolute. He must win . . . .What further
evidence do we need that the atheistic masters of the Kremlin are flagrantly
violating the principle of the Olympic Games when we consider that these 12
million athletes are trained from childhood to adolescence, like performers in a
circus, and to young manhood and womanhood? The head of government posses-
sion, direction, compulsion is everywhere. This is clearly in violation of Olympic
rules.
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These abuses of sport by the Soviet Union may be found to be
in contravention of the Olympic Rules and Regulations, and may
subject the Soviet NOC to sanctions by the IOC, thereby restricting
or suspending athletes from Olympic competition. Furthermore,
other nations' opposition to the Soviet's abuses may be expressed in a
variety of ways, including cessation of bilateral sports exchanges
with Soviet athletes.
17 1
D. Effectiveness of the Olympic System in Regulating Political
and Governmental Interference
For the most part, the Olympic System has effectively main-
tained obedience to its rules and regulations. A close working rela-
tionship between the IOC, the international federations, and the Na-
tional Olympic Committees, keeps the system working, provided that
each organ maintains control over its jurisdiction of participants.1
72
The three organs of the Olympic System attempt to stop any
political or governmental interference with its members so that the
problem does not become an international problem. The use of sports
for purposes of recognition and non-recognition of a nation's govern-
ment are examples of compliance and non-compliance, respectively,
with the rules of international sport. Using sports to formally recog-
nize a foreign government is encouraged by international law. East
Germany employed this system to gain diplomatic recognition.1 3 It
established contacts with individual nations in an effort to gain for-
mal recognition by the IOC so that it could compete under its own
flags and symbols in the Olympic Games, finally achieving this goal
in 1972.1
74
E. Visa Restrictions: Government Interference with Sport
The International Olympic Committee may have difficulty in
enforcing Olympic rules with regard to entrance of athletes of IOC-
recognized nations into a country hosting an athletic event because
of a government controlled legal device, the visa. 8 It is within the
powers of a government to grant or deny visas to athletes trying to
enter its country for sports participation, regardless of whether the
U.S. Congressional Record, Vol. 110, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, 1964, p. A1451, noted in id.
at 402.
171. For example, non-participation is used against South Africa as a sanction against
its apartheid policies. See infra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
172. Nafziger, Transnational Sports, supra note 1, at 203. See also supra notes 21-22,
29-31, 57-61 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
174. Nafziger and Strenk, supra note 34, at 262-64. See also text accompanying note
111.
175. Visa has been defined as "an authorization appended to a passport allowing entry
into a specific country." WEBSTER'S 11 NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 769 (5th ed. 1984).
[Vol. 6:3
INTERNATIONAL SPORTS
athletes are nationals of an IOC-recognized country.' 8
1. Case Example: East Germany and the NATO
Pact.-Before East Germany was formally recognized by the IOC,
many Western nations refused visas to East German athletes. Under
the terms of the Munich Pact, NATO member countries had an af-
firmative duty to prohibit the entry of East German nationals. Such
denial of visas is legal, since East Germany had not yet been recog-
nized by the IOC, and therefore, the host nation was not obligated to
permit East German athletes to compete. However, after formal rec-
ognition by the IOC, such denial of visas would constitute a violation
of Olympic Rule 3, which "prohibits discrimination against any
country or person on political grounds," 177 and any illegal political
interference with an Olympic sporting event.
2. Case Example: Canadian Restrictions on Visas to the Re-
public of China.-The visa was again used as a political tool by Ca-
nada in 1976. Canada violated a number of Olympic rules and
breached its promise to adhere to all Olympic rules and protocol
when it refused to admit the Republic of China to the 1976 Mon-
treal Games under its designation as the "Republic of China. ' 178
The IOC had recognized the NOC of the Republic of China, under
its chosen title,179 thereby giving its NOC the right to select the
team and send it to the Olympics to participate as the Republic of
China. Canada, as the host country was, therefore, under Olympic
Rules, obligated to admit all teams sent by the NOCs recognized by
the IOC.
In addition to breaching an express promise by Canadian Prime
Minister Trudeau, that "all Olympic rules and protocol would be
followed if Montieal were granted the Games," 80 Canada prevented
its NOC from fulfilling all duties and obligations undertaken upon
receiving host nation status.' 8 ' Under Olympic rules, Canada's NOC
had a duty to "guarantee that the Games will be organized to the
satisfaction of and in accordance with the requirements of the Inter-
national Olympic Committee .... 181 It was too late to change the
site of the Games when the IOC became aware that Canada would
176. For an example of visas being denied to a non-IOC-recognized country, see supra
note 109 and accompanying text.
177. Nafziger and Strenk, supra note 34, at 282.
178. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
179. Leiper, supra note 66, at 112. In 1968, the IOC recognized Taiwan as the "Repub-
lic of China." Id.
180. Id.
181. Canada seems to have feared cancellation of wheat sales to mainland China if she
were offended by the admittance of the team from the Republic of China. Id.
182. Rule 4, noted in Nafziger and Strenk, supra note 34, at 281.
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deny admission of the team from the Republic of China, therefore,
the IOC was forced to capitulate. 8" Because it was too late to
change the site for the Games, they were held without the Republic
of China, which reluctantly withdrew. 8
Canada's decision, motivated by its more friendly political rela-
tionship with the Peoples' Republic of China, resulted in political
discrimination against athletes from the Republic of China. This was
a clear violation of Olympic Rule 318" as well as the provision that
"[n]o legal condition or regulation may be valid in opposition to IOC
rules." ' Furthermore, this illegal act was unnecessary because the
Olympic rules provided an avenue for the Republic of China's ath-
letes to be admitted without Canada granting official recognition to
their government.' 87 Because of this, Canada should have allowed
the team from the Republic of China to enter the country and to
compete under its official name. No political interference of the Ca-
nadian government was necessary, and no formal recognition of the
government of the Republic of China as required. The athletes
would have been allowed to compete in the Olympic Games for the
sake of competition and sportsmanship.
The Canadian abuse of its control over visas demonstrates how
the political sphere may interfere with the realm of sports. Its use of
a sporting event to achieve better diplomatic relations with one na-
tion while causing diplomatic injury to another can only be classified
as an abuse of the Olympic System. Canada received the benefits
related to the prestige of hosting the Games, but did not fulfill all of
its obligations attached to such an honor. Such an abuse of sports
must be prevented in the future.'88
183. Leiper, supra note 66, at 112; see also Nafziger and Strenk, supra note 34, at 283.
184. In 1968, the IOC was almost forced to move the Winter Olympic Games from
Grenoble, France, to another location because of the French government's refusal to grant
visas to East German athletes. France, as a member of NATO, did not yet recognize East
Germany as an independent country. The solution was for East Germany athletes to compete
as part of the West German team. Leiper, supra note 66, at 113.
185. Rule 3, noted in Nafziger and Strenk, supra note 34, at 282.
186. Nafziger and Strenk, supra note 34, at 282.
187. Rule 25, "Recognition of ... a country['s] [National Olympic Committee] does
not imply political recognition of that country. Recognition of [a National Olympic Commit-
tee] is dependent on [its] country having enjoyed a stable government for a reasonable period
of time." Rule 25, noted in Nafziger and Strenk, supra note 34, at 281.
188.
The IOC and other international athletic organizations must assure their
members that the abuse of international sporting events like Canada's assault on
the Republic of China will not be tolerated. It is immaterial whether the Rules
operate as binding obligations or as the best evidence of customary global au-
thority. Every effort must be made to assure that the Olympic Rules and bilat-
eral commitments are honored at . . .other sites of international competition in
the future.
Nafziger and Strenk, supra note 34, at 283.
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F. Attacking Human Rights Violations Through International
Sports - South Africa: A Case Analysis
1. Apartheid and the Boycott of South Africa.-While Ca-
nada's political use of sports was detrimental to the Olympic Move-
ment, political employment of sports can be used to benefit sports
and people in general. Protection of human rights in apartheid is an
area of international concern in which the IOC, the United Nations,
and many governments have cooperated. Elimination of racial dis-
crimination within the sports arena and beyond the playing field are
one target of this international cooperation. In an effort to compel
countries like South Africa and Rhodesia 8'" to end their policies of
racial discrimination in sports, the IOC enforces the Olympic rules
and ensured that the NOCs are fulfilling their duties. The United
Nations has passed resolutions concerning sports and the apartheid
issue, and the member states of the IOC that have followed Olympic
rules and decisions and have adhered to U.N. resolutions on racial
discrimination in sports. 90
Under Rule 34, the NOCs must make sure that "no one has
been left out [of the Olympic Games] for racial ...reasons." ' 91 If
an NOC selects its Olympic team using the racially discriminatory
practices of that state, the NOC has violated Rule 34. This was the
case with the South African NOC. Up until 1964, the South African
team was limited to white athletes. Therefore, the IOC refused to
permit South African teams to participate in IOC events, based
upon an application of Rule 1.191 Admission of South African ath-
letes would indicate IOC approval of segregation against victims of
South Africa's discriminatory process." 3
Between 1964 and 1968, the South African government made
policy changes, adopting non-discriminatory practices of selecting,
training and lodging of its Olympic participants.1' 4 This new policy
did not affect competitions held in South Africa, which remained
segregated. The IOC was convinced that the new South African non-
discrimination policies met the rule requirements, and therefore de-
189. While the apartheid discussion in this Comment will be limited to the South Afri-
can policies of racial segregation, it is noted that the Rhodesian government also practices
apartheid and has thus been criticized for human rights violations. Rhodesian sports teams
have been multi-racial since 1971, and multiracial sporting events are conducted in Rhodesia.
Nafziger, Trqnsnational Sports, supra note 1, at 210-11. Nevertheless, Rhodesia has been the
object of diplomatic isolation because of its racially discriminatory policies. Nafziger and
Strenk, supra note 34, at 284 n.125.
190. Id. at 285.
191. Nafziger, Transnational Sports, supra note 1, at 206.
192. "Rule 1 of the Olympic Rules prohibits discrimination in the Games against any
country or person on grounds of race, religion or politics." Id.
193. Id. at 209.
194. Id. at 207.
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cided to recognize its NOC and extend South Africa an Olympic
invitation. Others, however, were not as easily convinced. Thirty-two
nations threatened a boycott of the 1968 Olympic Games unless the
South African team was excluded.195 The IOC finally buckled under
the threats of a boycott of the Games, and rescinded the South Afri-
can invitation. 196
It seems as if the IOC made a hasty decision in believing that
South Africa had significantly changed its apartheid policies when
such an important issue as human rights were involved. However,
the IOC is constantly working towards the goal of giving every na-
tions' teams an opportunity to participate in the Olympic Games,
based primarily on the Olympic ideals. The IOC tries to view the
situation with ignorance to politics and fairness to the athletes who
were originally the central figures of the Olympic Movement. The
threat of a boycott, however, would take an even larger number of
athletes out of the Games; because of this, the IOC gave in to the
threatening countries.
2. The Legality of Boycotts.-Boycotts,197 in general, are con-
trary to the Olympic rules because a boycott is a "form of political
interference in the activity of a nongovernmental organization. "198
However, in the situation of apartheid, fundamental human rights
principles outweigh any rights South Africa has in participating in
sports. Therefore boycotting racial discrimination and apartheid is
not only legitimate, 199 but may also be sanctioned by international
authority, provided that the reasons for the boycott are not in viola-
tion of the United Nations Charter. 00 In addition, the boycotting
nation must show that racial discrimination is used in training, team
selection and integration of teams.21
3. The United Nations Role in Combatting Apartheid through
Sports.-The U.N. itself has become involved in the fight against
195. Id.
196. Id. at 208.
197. Boycott was defined as "conduct whereby two or more States combine to interfere
with the economic or political freedom of another, as by cutting off trade with its territory," by
Professor Charles Cheney Hyde of Columbia University in an address entitled "The Boycott
as a Sanction of International Law," (Apr. 27, 1933). J. HOBERMAN, THE OLYMPIC CRISIS:
SPORT, POLITICS AND THE MORAL ORDER 6 (1986).
198. Id. at 5. See also Nafziger, Nonaggressive Sanctions, supra note 19, at 334.
199. Id.
200. Nafziger and Strenk, supra note 34, at 284. Article 2 of the United Nations Char-
ter provides that:
(4) All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
201. Nafziger, Nonaggressive Sanctions, supra note 19, at 335.
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apartheid, both in sports and beyond the sports arena. The Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, 0 2 as interpreted by the Supervisory Committee estab-
lished under this Convention, creates an affirmative duty of states to
implement the condemnation of apartheid. 03 Specific to apartheid in
sports is the United Nations Declaration against Apartheid in Sports
which provides: "States shall deny visas and/or entry to representa-
tives of sports bodies, members of teams or individual sportsmen
from any country practicing apartheid. 20 4 Both of these actions
taken by the United nations have proven successful, 20 5 and increased
the legitimacy of boycotts to fight official policies of racism.
Inherent in the fact that sport is important to the international
relations policies of South Africa, a boycott of its athletic teams
might impact heavily its foreign policy objectives and its relations
with other countries, causing the South African government to mod-
ify its apartheid policy. Perhaps such an effective tool might enhance
the progress for human rights.
Problems within the international sporting field have been suc-
cessfully remedied almost wholly under the laws and customs of the
International Olympic System. New issues,20 6 which closely follow
the ever-changing situations in the political world, arise in interna-
tional sports. A new issue that must be confronted by sports authori-
ties is the problem of terrorism.
202. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation (opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, noted in Nafziger, Nonaggres-
sive Sanctions, supra note 19) provides in pertinent part as follows:
Article 2(1):
(b) Each State Party undertakes not to sponsor, defined or support racial
discrimination by any persons or organizations.
(c) Each State Party shall take effective measures to review governmental,
national and local policies, and to amend, rescind or nullify any laws and regula-
tions which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination
wherever it exists;
Article 3:
States Parties particularly condemn racial segregation and apartheid and
undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of this nature in terri-
tories under their jurisdiction.
id. at 335-36.
203. Id. at 336.
204. U.N. Monthly Chronicle, 32 U.N. GAOR at 122, G.A. Res. 105(m) (1978).
205. "As of 1981, 92 of the 107 States Parties had taken steps to prohibit South African
sportsmen from entering their territories. Of the remaining 15 States, only eight have contin-
ued to allow South African athletes to compete in their territory." Nafziger, Nonaggressive
Sanctions, supra note 19, at 336.
206. For example, the problems concerning the two Germanys, the two Chinas and
later, apartheid in South Africa and Rhodesia were issues which arose in the international
sports world. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
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G. Terrorism Threatens Sports: Providing Security Against Politi-
cal Terrorism
Terrorism is a difficult problem to combat because it operates
on the element of surprise. Consequently, when dealing with terror-
ism in sports, the goals of an event's host are first, to deter terrorists
from attempting to attack, and second, to be prepared for any type
of attack, thereby eliminating the surprise factor. Because these are
difficult tasks to achieve, the key element to success is cooperation.
The IOC, its member states, the host nation and its NOC coop-
erate in order to create a safe location for the Olympic Games. All
of these groups have an interest in ensuring the safety of the athletes
and the other participants in the Olympic Games and, therefore,
they should be willing to cooperate.
The Olympic organizations must work within the Olympic rules
and regulations to ensure that the Games are conducted without in-
terference. First, the IOC has the responsibility of selecting the site
for the Olympic Games.107 Adequacy of security measures and char-
acteristics of the proposed Olympic site are important factors consid-
ered by the IOC for selection of a site. 08 The city bidding to host
the Games must convince the International Olympic Committee that
it has the capabilities of securing the city so that (1) it is extremely
unlikely that terrorists will attack, 09 and (2) if there is any type of
attack, security personnel will be well prepared to handle it. 10
Once the site has been chosen, the host city and the organizing
committee have primary responsibility for security measures, but the
government of the host country provides back-up support in most
instances. 1' The organizing committee, which is responsible for
preparation of the Olympic site and management of the Games,
forms a security organization that is run from a centrally located
headquarters. It is this organization that assumes primary responsi-
bility for the safety of the athletes and the Games. In addition, the
host nation, hoping to increase its prestige through the Games, has a
strong interest not only in the success of the Games but in prevent-
207. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
208. Size was one deciding factor in selecting Montreal in 1976. Officials believed it
might be easier to secure the Games in a smaller city than in a larger city like Los Angeles.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
209. Proof of ability to provide security for the city may be shown in the questionnaire
which each bidding city must submit to the 10C. J. LUCAS, supra note 39, at 144; see also
supra note 41 and accompanying text.
210. Id.
211. For example, in the 1988 Winter Games in Calgary, the city police secured events
held in Calgary, and the Royal Canadian Montreal Police (RCMP) were responsible for se-
curity outside the city. In the upcoming 1988 Summer Games in Seoul, the host nation, South
Korea has taken elaborate precautions to protect the athletes from feared terrorism from
North Korea. See Haberman, supra note 141.
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ing the occurrence of any major incidents. Because of this, the host
nation generally cooperates with the organizing committee to ensure
that the site is secure. The host nation may also solicit the coopera-
tion of other nations, especially in exchanging information about ter-
rorism and known terrorists.212 International cooperation in ensuring
the safety of the Olympic site will benefit all nations sending teams
to compete.
The countries sending teams to the Games are limited in the
actions they can take to ensure the safety of their athletes in the
territory of another government. Foreign nations cannot send armed
security personnel to the Games to protect their nationals because
the Games are in another country whose assurances of safety must
be relied on.213 A nation concerned for the safety of its athletes
might be limited to diplomatic channels: demand assurances that the
sports arena and Olympic Village are safe and secure. It is the host
nation's responsibility to ensure the safety of foreigners on its soil for
the Olympic Games.
While the 1972 Munich Games first alerted Olympic authorities
to the problem of terrorism in sports, subsequent host nations have
made tremendous efforts to guarantee the safety of athletes at the
Games." 4 Hopefully, security personnel at future Olympic sites will
not be forced to prove their readiness for a terrorist attack.
V. Conclusion
It has finally been universally accepted that politics and sports
are inseparable. Although Pierre de Coubertin, the founder of the
modern Olympics had hoped to keep politics out of the Olympic
Games, there has yet to be an Olympics without some form of politi-
cal overtones. Therefore, the goal of the organization within the
Olympic System is to control the use of politics in sport so that sport
is not misused or abused.
The rules and regulations of the International Olympic Com-
mittee can be applied to politics in sport to determine if sport is be-
ing abused. The Olympic rules operate to preserve the Olympic
Games and to protect the rights and interests of the individual ath-
212. The security personnel at the command post for the Calgary Games used com-
puters connected to Interpol data banks, which provide a checklist of suspected terrorists.
Howse, Securing the Games, MACLEANS, July 27, 1987, at 38. For the Seoul Games, the
South Korean officials will be assisted by some 40,000 American soldiers stationed in the coun-
try, if necessary. Haberman, supra note 141. Further, "Air Force planes may be flown in from
Japan, and [U.S.] Marine amphibious battalions based in Okinowa are to be made available."
Id.
213. For example, no bodyguards from foreign countries were permitted to carry weap-
ons in Canada during the 1988 Calgary Winter Games. Id.
214. See Haberman, supra note 141 for precautions to be taken in the 1988 Summer
Games in Seoul, South Korea.
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letes. When politics interfere in sports, resulting in injury to the
Games or to the athletes, the Olympic rules and international law
should be employed to punish the offenders.
With world politics constantly changing, the Olympic System
will be confronted by new situations in which countries try to manip-
ulate sports to their advantage. The states are forgetting the
Olympic ideals of sportsmanship and good will. Therefore, the orga-
nizations and members of the Olympic System will be forced to co-
operate to ensure that the interference of politics in the Olympic
arena does not destroy the Olympic Games or the ideals of the
Games.
Barbara Ann O'Neill
